A signature is only as good as the key somebody forgot to renew.
DKIM puts a cryptographic signature on your mail. The public half of the key sits in DNS, where it can be truncated, revoked, or deleted without a sound. SpoofKiller checks your selectors every 6 hours and reads your reports to see whether the signatures actually align.
Scans common provider selectors for your domain. Free, no account.
DKIM fails quietly, and it fails for boring reasons.
DKIM is the part of email authentication that survives forwarding. The sending server signs each message; the receiver fetches a public key from your DNS, at a name built from a label called a selector, and checks the signature. When it works, it is the sturdiest proof you have that a message is yours.
When it stops working, nothing tells you. The mail still sends. The provider's dashboard still shows green, because the provider is checking its own signature and not yours. The failures are dull: a key pasted into a DNS field that cut it off partway, a selector removed during a cleanup, a CNAME pointing at a service the company left two years ago.
A valid signature and an aligned signature are different things. DMARC only cares about the second.
Then there is the subtler trap. Many services sign your mail with their own domain by default. The signature passes. DMARC still fails, because the signing domain does not match your From address. Nothing is broken, strictly speaking; it was never set up. Common DKIM Errors walks through each case, and DMARC Alignment Explained covers the matching rules.
The key in DNS, and the result in the wild.
Two sources of truth. The DNS scan says whether a usable key is published. The reports say whether your senders are using it.
Key length
RSA keys under 1,024 bits are flagged as too weak to trust. 1,024-bit keys get a nudge toward 2,048. Ed25519 keys are recognized.
Revoked keys
A record with an empty p= tag is a deliberately revoked key. If a service is still signing with that selector, its signatures now fail.
Malformed keys
A public key that cannot be parsed, usually because a DNS editor truncated or split it badly, is as good as no key.
Dangling CNAMEs
Many providers have you publish a CNAME to a key they host. If the target no longer exists, the selector resolves to nothing.
Record hygiene
Two records at one selector, a wrong version tag, a key limited to SHA-1, a wildcard record, or a selector left in testing mode.
Alignment, from reports
The share of reported mail carrying a DKIM signature for your own domain, per sender. A signature for the provider's domain does not count.
- Valid
google._domainkey
Common selector · RSA 2048
- Weak key
s1._domainkey
Common selector · RSA 1024
- Revoked
billing2024._domainkey
Added by you · p= empty
Selectors cannot be enumerated
You name the locks. We check the keys.
Setup is a short list of selector names. From then on the checks run without you. If you are configuring DKIM for the first time, the provider guides for Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 show where the signing switch lives; copy the exact record values from the provider's admin console.

- 1
Tell us your selectors
Add the selectors your sending services use. You will find each one in that service's admin console, or in the s= tag of a DKIM-Signature header on mail it sent.
- 2
We add the usual suspects
SpoofKiller also probes a list of selectors commonly used by popular providers, such as google, selector1, and s1, in case a key exists that nobody wrote down.
- 3
Every key is inspected every 6 hours
Each selector is fetched and its record parsed: version, key type, key length, revocation, testing flag. Problems become findings; changes are logged with before and after.
- 4
Reports supply the verdict
Aggregate reports show, per sender, whether mail carried a DKIM signature that passed and aligned with your domain. That is the number that decides DMARC.
What DKIM monitoring cannot see.
Selectors it was never told about
A selector that is neither on your list nor on the common list is not checked. The reports will still show whether that sender's mail aligns, which is usually how such a selector gets discovered.
The private key
SpoofKiller reads the public key in DNS. It cannot tell whether the matching private key has leaked, or whether a provider is signing with a different key than the one published.
Individual messages
Aggregate reports give counts, not messages. To see why one specific email failed, paste its headers into the email header analyzer.
Mail no receiver reported
Alignment figures come from participating receivers. They are a broad sample of your mail, not all of it.
See which of your keys answer the door.
The free DKIM checker probes the common provider selectors for your domain and reports key length and revocation for each one it finds. Know a selector we would not guess? You can enter it there too.
Free. No account. The lookup runs against live DNS.
Signatures passing, DMARC failing?
That is nearly always alignment. Send the domain and the name of the service, and we will tell you which setting to look for.
- A person reads every message
- No sales sequence, no list rental
- Reply within one business day
Questions about DKIM monitoring
Straight answers. If yours is not here, ask us and a person will reply.
Know the day a key goes missing.
Add a domain, list your selectors, and SpoofKiller checks every key every 6 hours. One domain is free.
Keep reading
- SpoofKillerFree ToolsTwelve free tools for checking and building DMARC, SPF, DKIM, MX, BIMI, and DNS records. No signup for lookups.Read
- Free toolDomain Health CheckerRun a full email security scan on any domain. DMARC, SPF, DKIM, MX, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, and BIMI, scored and explained. No signup.Read
- DocsDomain VerificationHow DNS TXT verification works and why reports stay locked until it passes.Read
- SpoofKillerFeaturesDMARC analytics, sender identification, spoofing detection, DNS change monitoring, blacklist checks, and reports.Read
- SpoofKillerKnowledge BasePlain-English guides to DMARC, SPF, DKIM, spoofing, and deliverability.Read
- GuideCommon DKIM ErrorsTruncated keys, wrong selectors, signatures that pass and still fail DMARC, and how to repair them.Read
