Anyone on earth can send an email that says it is from you. Not from an address that resembles yours. From yours, letter for letter, with your domain after the @ sign. No password is stolen and no server is breached. The sender simply types your address into the From line, the way a person might write someone else’s return address on an envelope, and the mail system, which was built on the charming assumption that nobody would do such a thing, delivers it.
DMARC is the correction to that assumption. It arrived roughly thirty years late, it is published as a line of text in DNS, and it has the least inviting name in the history of security. It is also the only widely adopted way for a domain owner to tell the world’s mail servers what to do with mail that claims to be from that domain and cannot prove it.
The problem: the From line is on the honor system
An email carries two sender addresses. One is the envelope sender, used by mail servers to route bounces; you almost never see it. The other is the From header, the one your mail program displays in bold. The protocol that moves mail, SMTP, checks neither. A message from ceo@yourcompany.com asking accounts payable to wire money to a new vendor is, as far as SMTP is concerned, perfectly in order.
Two older standards tried to patch this. SPF lets a domain publish the list of servers allowed to send its mail. DKIM lets a sending server attach a cryptographic signature that a receiver can verify. Both are useful. Both have the same hole: neither one is required to have anything to do with the address in the From line. A forger can pass SPF for a domain he owns, sign with a key he owns, and still display your name to the recipient. The checks pass. The lie stands.
What DMARC is, in one paragraph
DMARC stands for Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, which is three ideas wearing one trench coat. It is defined in RFC 7489, and it adds exactly three things to SPF and DKIM:
- Alignment. It is no longer enough for SPF or DKIM to pass for some domain. One of them must pass for a domain that matches the one in the From header. This closes the hole.
- Policy. The domain owner publishes what receivers should do with mail that fails: nothing, send it to spam, or refuse it.
- Reporting. Receivers send the domain owner a daily summary of the mail they saw claiming to be from the domain, and how it fared.
The rule itself is short. A message passes DMARC if SPF passes and aligns with the From domain, or DKIM passes and aligns with the From domain. One is enough. If neither does, the message fails, and the receiver consults your policy. The step-by-step account of how DMARC works follows a single message through that decision.
SPF and DKIM ask whether a message is authentic. DMARC asks the more awkward question: authentic on whose behalf?
What a DMARC record looks like
DMARC lives in DNS as a TXT record at the name _dmarc under your domain. A complete, valid record can be this brief:
_dmarc.example.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"Three tags, three jobs:
v=DMARC1identifies the record. It must come first.p=noneis the policy. The options arenone(monitor only),quarantine(treat failures as suspicious, usually the spam folder), andreject(refuse them). The guide to none versus quarantine versus reject covers when to use each.rua=is the address where receivers send aggregate reports.
There are other tags, for subdomains, strictness, and gradual rollout, but most domains need few of them. You can see what yours says right now with the free DMARC checker, which also translates each tag into English.
What DMARC actually does for you
It makes exact-domain forgery fail
With an enforcing policy, quarantine or reject, mail that puts your domain in the From line without authenticating as your domain gets filtered or refused by receivers that honor DMARC. That includes the large mailbox providers, which is where most of your customers and employees read their mail. The enforcement is theirs, not yours and not ours: your record is a published request, and the receiving server carries it out.
It shows you who is sending as you
This is the part people underrate. Even at p=none, the reports arrive. They list every IP address that participating receivers saw sending mail with your domain in the From line, with pass and fail counts for each. Most domain owners discover two things in the first week: a few services they forgot they had authorized, such as the invoicing tool or the newsletter platform, and a few senders they have never heard of. Reading the raw XML is nobody’s idea of a good time, so tools exist to do it; the guide to understanding DMARC reports explains what you are looking at, and DMARC monitoring does the reading for you.
It keeps your legitimate mail deliverable
Since 2024, Google and Yahoo have required a DMARC record from anyone sending bulk mail to their users, along with SPF and DKIM. Mail from domains without one is increasingly treated as mail from someone who could not be bothered, and filtered accordingly.
What DMARC does not do
The fine print matters here, because DMARC is routinely sold as more than it is.
| The trick | Does DMARC address it? |
|---|---|
| Mail forged with your exact domain in the From line | Yes, at receivers that honor your enforcing policy |
| A lookalike domain, such as yourcornpany.com | No. That domain has its own DMARC, and the forger controls it |
| A display name that says “Your CEO” over a free webmail address | No. DMARC checks the domain, not the name beside it |
| A real employee account that has been compromised | No. That mail is authentic by every technical measure |
| Spam and phishing that never mentions your domain | No |
Two more caveats. A DMARC failure is not proof of forgery: mail that is forwarded, or relayed through a mailing list, often fails through no fault of the sender. And a policy of none stops nothing at all. It is a listening post, not a lock. The piece on domain impersonation protection sorts each kind of impersonation by the defense that applies to it.
Who needs a DMARC record
Every domain. That includes the ones that send no mail. A parked domain with no DMARC record is the ideal disguise, since there is no legitimate mail to confuse the issue and no one watching. For a domain that never sends, the entire configuration is two records and can be finished before the coffee is cold:
example.net. TXT "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.example.net. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject"For a domain that does send mail, the work is real but finite: find out who sends on your behalf, make each of those senders authenticate with alignment, and then raise the policy. The size of your company is beside the point. Forgers do not check headcount.
Where to start
Begin by looking. Run your domain through the free domain health check to see whether a DMARC record exists, what it says, and whether SPF and DKIM are in a state to support it. If there is no record, build one with the DMARC record generator and follow the walkthrough in how to configure DMARC. Start at p=none with a reporting address, read what comes back for a few weeks, fix the legitimate senders that fail, and only then tighten.
If you would rather not read XML over breakfast, SpoofKiller will receive the reports for you and turn them into a list of senders and a short list of things to fix. One domain is free; the pricing page has the rest. Either way, publish the record. The forger is not waiting for you to finish the reading.

