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Understanding DMARC Reports: What They Tell You

What arrives in your reporting inbox, who sends it, and how to turn it into decisions.

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An analyst's desk seen from above, with printed charts, a magnifying glass, and a stack of envelopes.
The reports arrive daily and in bulk. The skill is in knowing which four questions to ask of them.
In this guideShow 7 sections

A day or two after you publish a DMARC record with a reporting address, the mail begins. It comes from addresses with names like noreply-dmarc-support, it has subject lines that read like serial numbers, and each message carries a compressed attachment containing XML. There is no greeting and no explanation. It is as though you had subscribed, by accident, to the internal memoranda of the world’s postal services.

In a sense you have. Those attachments are the most useful thing DMARC produces: a first-hand account, from the receiving side, of every server sending mail under your name. This guide covers what the reports are, who sends them, what they leave out, and how to turn them into the three or four decisions they exist to support. The companion piece, aggregate reports explained field by field, takes the XML apart tag by tag.

Two kinds of report, one of which you will actually get

DMARC defines two report types, requested by two different tags in your record.

Aggregate (rua)Failure (ruf)
What it isA daily summary of counts per sending sourceA notice about one individual failing message
FormatXML, compressedA message with headers, sometimes redacted
Contains message contentNoPotentially headers and more, hence the privacy concern
Who sends itMost large mailbox providers and many othersVery few receivers
UsefulnessThe foundation of everythingOccasional, when it arrives at all

Failure reports, sometimes called forensic reports, were meant to deliver a copy of each failing message so that you could examine it. Because that could expose personal information, most large receivers decline to send them. You may add a ruf tag; you should not plan around it. Everything below concerns aggregate reports.

Who sends them, and when

Reports are sent by receiving mail systems that participate in DMARC reporting: the large consumer mailbox providers, many business email hosts and security gateways, and a long tail of universities, ISPs, and regional providers. Each sends its own report covering only the mail it received.

The default interval is once every 24 hours, and most reporters keep to it; a few send more often. A report sent today describes mail received yesterday, by the reporter’s clock, in UTC. So the data is always a day or so behind, and a domain that mails customers at dozens of different providers will receive dozens of reports a day. A busy domain can receive hundreds.

The reports arrive as email attachments with a filename that follows a convention:

receiver.example!example.com!1794787200!1794873599.xml.gz

That is the reporter, your domain, and the start and end of the period as Unix timestamps. The format is built for machines, and it shows.

What a report tells you

Each aggregate report answers, for one receiver and one day:

  • Which IP addresses sent mail with your domain in the From header, and how many messages came from each.
  • How SPF and DKIM turned out for each group of messages, and which domains they were evaluated against.
  • Whether the result aligned with your From domain, which is what determines the DMARC verdict.
  • What the receiver did: delivered, quarantined, or rejected, and whether it overrode your policy and why.
  • Which policy it found in your DNS at the time, a useful check that your record says what you think it says.

What a report does not tell you

The omissions matter as much as the contents.

  • No message content. No subject lines, no bodies, no recipient addresses, no individual sender addresses. Only domains, IPs, and counts.
  • No names. A report says 198.51.100.77, not “your newsletter platform.” Working out who owns each address is left to you, through reverse DNS and the SPF and DKIM domains listed alongside it.
  • Not all your mail. Only receivers that choose to send reports appear. Mail delivered to servers that do not report is invisible. The reports are a large, representative sample. They are not a ledger.
  • No verdict on intent. A row of failures might be an impostor. It might equally be your own mail, forwarded by a recipient to another mailbox, or a tool the sales team adopted last month. The report records what happened, not why.
A DMARC report is a list of license plates. It tells you who drove past using your name. It does not tell you who was at the wheel.

The four questions to ask of your reports

Nobody needs to read reports for their own sake. They exist to answer four questions, in this order.

1. Who is sending as my domain?

Group the rows by source and identify each one. Most will resolve into services you know. Some will be services you had forgotten. The sending sources documentation describes how SpoofKiller matches IPs to known providers and how confident each match is.

2. Which of my real senders are failing?

These are the urgent ones, because they are the mail you would lose under an enforcing policy. The usual cause is a service that passes SPF and DKIM for its own domain instead of yours. The cure is to enable signing with your domain at that service; alignment explained covers why.

3. What is left over?

After the known senders are accounted for, the remainder falls into recognizable patterns:

PatternLikely explanation
SPF fails, DKIM passes and aligns, source is a mailbox provider or universityForwarding. Harmless; DMARC still passes
Both fail, DKIM domain is yours but the signature did not verify, low volumeA mailing list or gateway modified the message
SPF and DKIM pass for someone else’s domain, steady volumeA legitimate service that was never configured for your domain
Nothing passes, no DKIM signature, unfamiliar networks, bursts of volumePossible impersonation

These are patterns, not proofs. Spoofing detection applies rules of this kind to every source and shows a confidence level with the evidence behind it, so that a forwarded newsletter is not mistaken for a crime.

4. Am I ready to tighten the policy?

When every sender you recognize passes and what fails is forwarding or strangers, you can move from none toward quarantine and reject. The decision is covered in none vs quarantine vs reject, and SpoofKiller summarizes it as a status described under enforcement readiness.

Where to send the reports

The rua tag takes one or more mailto: addresses, separated by commas:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com,mailto:abc123@reports.vendor.example

Do not use a person’s inbox. Use a dedicated mailbox or, more practically, the address of a service that parses the reports. If the address is at a different domain from the one the record protects, the receiving domain must publish a small authorization record, or reporters will ignore the request:

example.com._report._dmarc.reports.vendor.example.  TXT  "v=DMARC1"

Reporting services publish this for their customers as a matter of course; it is your concern only if you route reports to another domain of your own. The reporting setup guide shows how to add a SpoofKiller reporting address to an existing record without disturbing the one you already have.

Reading them without losing a weekend

You can read a report by hand. Decompress it, open the XML, and work down the rows. It is a worthwhile exercise once. To skip the decompressing, upload a file to the free DMARC report analyzer, which turns it into a table of sources with pass and fail counts.

The difficulty is not any single report. It is that the meaning lives in the aggregate: forty reports a day, combined across weeks, grouped by sender instead of by receiver. That is arithmetic, and arithmetic is what software is for. DMARC monitoring ingests every report, merges them into one account of who sends as you, and tells you what changed. One domain is free, with seven days of history; longer retention is on the pricing page.

However you read them, read them. A reporting address nobody checks is a suggestion box in an empty building.

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