Somebody is sending mail as your domain. Here is the list.
Mailbox providers already send you a daily account of every server that used your domain. It arrives as compressed XML, addressed to an inbox nobody opens. SpoofKiller reads it and gives you the names.
Looks up your current record and policy. Free, no account.
The reports exist. Reading them is the unpaid job.
Email was designed by trusting people. Any server may write any address in the From line, and for decades the receiving end simply believed it. DMARC is the correction. It lets a domain owner say which mail is genuine and what to do with the rest, and it asks receivers to report back on what they saw.
That last part is the valuable one, and the one almost everybody wastes. The reports come as XML, zipped, one file per receiver per day. A single file looks like a tax form filled out by a machine. A month of them is a filing cabinet. So the reporting address is set once, to a mailbox belonging to someone who has since left, and the record sits at p=none for years.
Meanwhile the domain stays forgeable. A policy of none asks receivers to do nothing, and they oblige. You cannot safely move to quarantine or reject until you know every legitimate sender is passing, and you cannot know that without reading the reports. If the mechanics are new to you, Understanding DMARC Reports covers what arrives and why.

A policy of none asks receivers to do nothing, and they oblige.
It turns a pile of XML into a short list of decisions.
No summaries of summaries. Each mechanic below is something the product does to every report it accepts.
A reporting address per domain
Every domain gets a unique address. Reports mailed to it are matched to the right domain and the right account without any guessing from the file contents.
Hardened parsing
Reports are attachments from strangers. Compressed and decompressed sizes are capped, and any XML carrying a DOCTYPE or ENTITY declaration is rejected outright. XML, ZIP, and GZ are accepted.
Rollups by source and by day
Rows are totaled per sending IP, per day, and per reporting organization: messages, DMARC pass, SPF alignment, DKIM alignment, and the disposition the receiver applied.
Names for the IP addresses
Reverse DNS, the announcing network, and the authenticated domains are weighed to name the likely provider, with a confidence score. See how sources are identified.
Detection on every new report
Each report is run through the spoofing detection rules, which separate probable impersonation from forwarding and from your own misconfigured services.
Silence is noticed too
If a domain that had been receiving reports goes quiet for several days, you get a missing-reports alert. A deleted rua tag should not pass for good news.
Four steps. One of them is waiting.
The full walkthrough, with the exact record syntax, is in Sending DMARC Reports to SpoofKiller. No record yet? The DMARC record generator writes one.
- 1
Add the domain and prove it is yours
You publish one TXT record. Until it resolves, report data stays locked, so nobody can read the mail flows of a domain they do not control.
- 2
Point your reports at SpoofKiller
Each domain gets its own reporting address. You add it to the rua tag of your DMARC record, alongside any address already there.
- 3
Wait a day
Receivers send aggregate reports roughly once every 24 hours. The first ones usually land within a day or two of the record change.
- 4
Read the table, not the XML
Sources appear with names, volumes, and pass rates. You classify each one, fix the ones that are yours, and watch the rest.
Volume on top. Culprits underneath.
The screens below use example values and documentation IP addresses. Yours will have your senders in them, which is rather the point.
Messages
5,168
DMARC pass
93.8%
Reporters
4
| Source | Confidence | Messages | DMARC pass | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Google Workspace192.0.2.14 | 96% | 4,210 | 100% | Approved |
| Invoicing service198.51.100.7 | 82% | 640 | 71% | Needs DKIM |
| Not identified203.0.113.45 | n/a | 318 | 0% | Unknown |
The chart answers one question: is the failing share steady, or did it jump? The table answers the next: which source is responsible? From there each row is a decision. A known service that fails needs its DKIM or return-path fixed. An unknown source that fails is either a forwarder, a forgotten tool, or a stranger, and alignment is usually what tells them apart. When the legitimate rows are all green, the Enforcement Readiness status turns green with them.
What DMARC monitoring cannot tell you.
Better to hear it from us now than to deduce it in a meeting later.
Reports are a sample, not a ledger
Only receivers that choose to send aggregate reports appear. Mail delivered to a provider that sends none is invisible here, however much of it there is.
It is a day behind, by design
Receivers batch their reports, typically every 24 hours. Aggregate reporting describes yesterday. Nothing about it is real-time.
No message content
Aggregate reports carry counts and authentication results. You will not see subject lines, recipients, or bodies, so you cannot read the forged message itself.
Monitoring is not enforcement
SpoofKiller does not block anything. Receiving servers act on the policy you publish. Until that policy is quarantine or reject, failing mail is still delivered.
Plans have a monthly report volume
Free accepts 300 report files a month and Starter 3,000. Files beyond the allowance are not processed until the next period or an upgrade.
Lookalike domains are a separate problem
DMARC protects your exact domain. A forger using a similar-looking name is outside its reach; that is what lookalike discovery is for.
Start with the record you already have.
The free DMARC checker fetches your record, validates every tag, and shows the policy receivers will actually apply. If it says p=none with no rua address, you have just found the first thing to fix.
Free. No account. The lookup runs against live DNS.
Have us read your record for you
Send the domain. We will check its DMARC, SPF, and DKIM, and write back with what we found and what to do first.
- A person reads every message
- No sales sequence, no list rental
- Reply within one business day
Questions about DMARC monitoring
Straight answers. If yours is not here, ask us and a person will reply.
See who is on your guest list.
Monitor one domain free, with 7 days of report history. No card. Upgrade when you want names, alerts, and a longer memory.
Keep reading
- DocsDMARC Reporting SetupAdd your unique reporting address to the rua tag and confirm that reports arrive.Read
- GuideAggregate Reports ExplainedEvery element of a DMARC aggregate XML report, what it means, and which ones matter.Read
- GuideUnderstanding DMARC ReportsWhat arrives in your reporting inbox, who sends it, and how to turn it into decisions.Read
- Free toolDMARC Report AnalyzerUpload a DMARC aggregate report (XML, ZIP, or GZ) and read it as a table: sources, pass and fail counts, and alignment.Read
- DocsEnforcement ReadinessWhat the readiness status measures and how to move safely toward p=reject.Read
- DocsProtection ScoreThe categories, weights, and limits of SpoofKiller's 0 to 100 domain score.Read
