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Policies and enforcement

DMARC None vs Quarantine vs Reject: Which Policy and When

What each DMARC policy tells receivers to do, what it costs you to get it wrong, and a safe order for moving up.

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A hand pressing a rubber stamp onto an envelope against an orange starburst.
Three stamps, one desk. Which one a failing message receives is the only decision the policy tag makes.
In this guideShow 8 sections

A great many domains have a DMARC record that says p=none, and a great many of their owners believe they are protected. They are not. They have installed a security camera and declined to install a door. The camera is valuable; it records everyone who walks in. But the people walking in are not inconvenienced in the slightest.

The p tag is the one part of a DMARC record that asks receiving mail servers to do something. It has three possible values. Choosing among them is less a technical question than a question of nerve, and the right answer for nearly every domain is: all three, in order, with evidence in hand before each move.

What the policy tag actually controls

The policy applies only to mail that fails DMARC, meaning mail with your domain in the From header for which neither SPF nor DKIM passed with alignment. Mail that passes is untouched by any policy. So the question each value answers is narrow: when a receiver sees mail that claims to be yours and cannot prove it, what would you like done?

The receiver does the doing. Your record is a request published in DNS, and receivers that participate in DMARC, including the large mailbox providers, generally honor it. They also reserve the right not to, particularly for mail they recognize as forwarded.

p=none: watch, and touch nothing

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

A policy of none asks receivers to deliver failing mail exactly as they would have anyway, and to send you reports about it. It is monitoring mode. A forged message from your domain lands wherever the receiver’s spam filter would have put it without DMARC.

This is the correct place to start and a poor place to stay. It is correct because you almost certainly do not know every service that sends mail as your domain, and none lets you find out without consequences. It is poor because, once you know, continuing to ask for nothing is a choice the forgers appreciate. A record with p=none and no rua address is the worst of both: no enforcement and no information. It satisfies a checklist and nothing else.

p=quarantine: the spam folder

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

quarantine asks receivers to treat failing mail as suspicious. What that means is up to the receiver, but in practice it means the junk folder, sometimes with a warning attached. The message still exists. A determined recipient can find it, and a legitimate message caught by mistake can be fished out.

That recoverability is the point. Quarantine is the rehearsal for reject: if you have missed a legitimate sender, its mail goes to spam, somebody complains, and you fix it. Nothing is lost. The cost is that forged mail is also still there in the junk folder, waiting for the one recipient in a hundred who goes looking.

p=reject: the door

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

reject asks receivers to refuse failing mail outright, during the SMTP conversation. The message is never delivered to any folder. The sending server gets an error; if it is a legitimate server, it generates a bounce, and if it is a forger’s, nobody is told anything, which is as it should be.

This is the destination. It is the only policy under which exact-domain forgery reliably fails at participating receivers, and it is a precondition for a few other things, such as having your logo displayed through BIMI, which requires an enforcing policy; the BIMI checker will tell you whether yours qualifies. Its cost is equally plain: a legitimate sender you forgot about will have its mail refused, and the recipient will never know there was anything to look for.

Quarantine forgives your mistakes. Reject does not. That is the argument for doing them in that order.

The three policies side by side

nonequarantinereject
Failing mail isDelivered normallyUsually sent to spamRefused at the door
Reports sentYesYesYes
Stops exact-domain forgeryNoMostly; it is hidden, not goneYes, at receivers that honor it
If you missed a legitimate senderNothing happensIts mail goes to spamIts mail bounces
Qualifies for BIMINoYes, when applied to all mailYes
Use itFirst, for weeksSecond, as a rehearsalPermanently

Two dials that soften the jump: pct and sp

pct: enforce on a fraction

The pct tag applies your policy to a percentage of failing messages. The rest are treated under the next policy down: with p=quarantine; pct=25, a quarter of failing mail is quarantined and three quarters is delivered as under none; with p=reject; pct=25, a quarter is rejected and the rest is quarantined.

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=25; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

The sampling is random and per message, so pct does not protect any particular sender; it limits how much damage a mistake does while you find it. If the tag is absent, the value is 100. Note also that pct has no effect on a policy of none, since there is nothing to apply.

sp: a separate rule for subdomains

By default, your policy covers every subdomain that lacks its own DMARC record. The sp tag sets a different policy for those subdomains. It cuts both ways. You can protect unused subdomains immediately while the main domain is still under observation:

v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

Only do this if no subdomain sends legitimate mail; a newsletter sent from news.example.com would be caught by it. The opposite arrangement, p=reject; sp=none, is occasionally seen in the wild and is an open invitation: a forger simply uses anything.example.com. The DMARC checker flags it.

When to move up, and how to know

The order is fixed. The timing depends on what your reports say, not on the calendar. A workable sequence:

  1. Publish p=none with a rua address. Use the DMARC record generator if you would rather not type it. Wait for reports; give it at least two to four weeks so that monthly senders, such as the invoicing run or the newsletter, have a chance to appear.
  2. Account for every source. For each sending IP in the reports, decide whether it is yours. Fix the ones that are yours and failing, usually by enabling DKIM with your own domain at that provider. The guide to understanding DMARC reports explains how to read them.
  3. Move to quarantine, optionally with a low pct. Raise the percentage as the reports stay quiet.
  4. Move to reject. Again with pct if you are cautious, then remove the tag.

The test before each step is the same: is all the mail you recognize as yours passing DMARC, and is what still fails either forwarding or strangers? When the answer is yes, move. The full staged plan, with the checks before each step, is in how to reach p=reject without losing legitimate mail. SpoofKiller reduces the question to a status, green, yellow, or red, described in the enforcement readiness documentation, and DMARC monitoring keeps watching after you arrive, because new senders have a way of appearing without telling anyone.

What each mistake costs

There are two ways to get this wrong, and they are not equally common. The rare mistake is moving to reject too early: some legitimate mail bounces, someone notices within a day or two, and the record is rolled back with a single DNS edit. It is embarrassing and brief.

The common mistake is never moving at all. A domain sits at p=none for years because nobody was assigned to read the reports, and the first sign of trouble is a customer asking why your company sent her a fraudulent invoice. That mistake is not rolled back with a DNS edit. Staying at none feels like the cautious choice. It is merely the quiet one.

If the reading of reports is what stands between you and enforcement, that is a solvable problem; plans that do it for you start at free, and the details are on the pricing page.

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