A man walks into a bank and presents a driver’s license. It is real. The state issued it, the hologram shimmers, the photograph is him. He then asks to withdraw money from an account belonging to someone else. The teller does not say, “Well, the license is valid.” The teller checks whether the name on the license matches the name on the account.
That second check is alignment. It is the whole idea behind DMARC, and it explains the most common complaint in email authentication: “SPF passes. DKIM passes. Why does DMARC fail?” Because passing was never the question. The question is whose name was on the pass.
An email has three domains, and you only see one
Every message carries up to three separate domain identities:
| Identity | Where it lives | Who checks it | Visible to the reader? |
|---|---|---|---|
| From domain | The From: header | DMARC | Yes |
| Envelope sender | Return-Path / MAIL FROM | SPF | No |
| Signing domain | d= in the DKIM signature | DKIM | No |
Here is the gap that forgers lived in for decades. SPF validates the envelope sender. DKIM validates the signing domain. Neither one looks at the From header, which is the only thing a human being reads. A criminal could send mail with a From line of ceo@yourcompany.com, an envelope sender at his own domain, and a signature from his own domain. SPF passes. DKIM passes. Both are telling the truth about the wrong thing.
DMARC closes the gap with one rule: a message passes if SPF or DKIM passes, and the domain that passed aligns with the From domain. One aligned pass is enough. Two unaligned passes are worth nothing. For the full sequence of checks, see How DMARC Works.
The classic failure, in headers
This is what the problem looks like in the wild:
Return-Path: <bounce-7731@mail.crm-vendor.example>
From: "Acme Billing" <billing@acme.com>
DKIM-Signature: v=1; d=crm-vendor.example; s=k1; ...
Authentication-Results: mx.receiver.example;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mail.crm-vendor.example;
dkim=pass header.d=crm-vendor.example;
dmarc=fail header.from=acme.comNothing here is forged. Acme hired a CRM vendor, the vendor sent the invoice, and every check the vendor is responsible for succeeded. But the receiver compares acme.com with crm-vendor.example, twice, and finds no match either time. DMARC fails. To a receiver, this legitimate invoice is indistinguishable from a forgery, which is exactly the point of the rule.
You can run this comparison on any message by pasting its headers into the email header analyzer.
Relaxed and strict: how close is close enough
DMARC offers two definitions of a match, set separately for each mechanism.
- Relaxed (the default): the two domains must share the same organizational domain.
mail.acme.comaligns withacme.com. - Strict: the two domains must be identical.
mail.acme.comdoes not align withacme.com.
The organizational domain is the part you registered: one label plus a public suffix. For news.mail.acme.com it is acme.com. For shop.acme.co.uk it is acme.co.uk, since co.uk is a suffix that anyone can register under. Receivers work this out from a public list of such suffixes.
You set the mode in your DMARC record with two optional tags:
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; rua=mailto:reports@acme.com
adkim=r relaxed DKIM alignment (default) adkim=s strict
aspf=r relaxed SPF alignment (default) aspf=s strictOmit the tags and you get relaxed for both. Here is how the two modes judge the same messages:
| From domain | Authenticated domain | Relaxed | Strict |
|---|---|---|---|
| acme.com | acme.com | Aligned | Aligned |
| acme.com | bounces.acme.com | Aligned | Not aligned |
| news.acme.com | acme.com | Aligned | Not aligned |
| acme.com | acme-mail.com | Not aligned | Not aligned |
| acme.com | crm-vendor.example | Not aligned | Not aligned |
Row four deserves a second look. A lookalike domain never aligns with yours, in either mode. That is good. It also means the owner of acme-mail.com can publish his own SPF, DKIM, and DMARC and pass all three as himself. Alignment protects your exact domain and nothing adjacent to it; see Domain Impersonation Protection for what covers the rest.
SPF alignment: the Return-Path problem
SPF alignment compares the From domain with the envelope sender. The envelope sender is chosen by whichever system sends the mail, because that is where bounces are delivered, and email platforms like to receive their own bounces. So by default, most third-party senders use a Return-Path on their domain. SPF passes for them and aligns with no one.
This is why adding a vendor’s include to your SPF record so often accomplishes nothing. Your record is consulted only when your domain is the envelope sender. If the vendor’s domain is in the Return-Path, the receiver reads the vendor’s SPF record, and yours sits there unread.
The fix is a custom Return-Path, sometimes called a custom bounce domain or custom MAIL FROM. You create a subdomain such as bounces.acme.com, point it at the vendor with a CNAME, and the vendor uses it as the envelope sender. Under relaxed alignment, that subdomain matches acme.com. Under aspf=s it does not, which is the main reason strict SPF alignment breaks working setups.
One more limit: SPF alignment cannot survive forwarding. When a message is forwarded, a new server delivers it, and SPF fails outright. The guide to common SPF errors covers this and the other ways the mechanism breaks.
DKIM alignment: the d= tag
DKIM alignment compares the From domain with the d= value of a signature that verified. It is the sturdier of the two, because the signature travels inside the message and survives forwarding intact.
The failure mode is the one shown earlier: the platform signs with its own domain. The cure is to have it sign with yours. In the platform’s settings this is called domain authentication, custom DKIM, or a verified domain. You publish a key, or a CNAME to a key, under selector._domainkey.acme.com, and from then on signatures carry d=acme.com.
Two details are worth knowing. A message can carry several signatures, and DMARC is satisfied if any one of them both verifies and aligns. And a signature with d=acme.com aligns, under relaxed mode, with mail from any subdomain of acme.com. Check that the key is actually published with the DKIM checker; Common DKIM Errors covers what goes wrong.
SPF alignment is a return address on the envelope. DKIM alignment is a signature on the letter. Envelopes get replaced in transit. Signatures do not.
When strict alignment is worth it
Rarely. Strict mode sounds like the secure choice, and people select it for the same reason they choose the longest password option. But relaxed alignment is not lax. It still requires the authenticated domain to be one you control.
Strict alignment makes sense when your subdomains are not all yours to vouch for:
- You delegate subdomains to customers, franchisees, or departments that run their own mail.
- A third party controls DNS for a subdomain, and you do not want its mail to pass as your parent domain.
If neither applies, strict mode buys little and costs real mail: every custom Return-Path on a subdomain stops aligning under aspf=s. If you do adopt it, treat it as a policy change. Watch your reports before and after, as you would when moving from none to quarantine or reject.
Finding misaligned senders and fixing them
Your aggregate reports record alignment for every source. Each row carries two sets of results. The raw auth_results say whether SPF and DKIM passed and for which domain. The policy_evaluated block says whether each one counted for DMARC, which is to say whether it aligned. A row showing a raw pass and an evaluated fail is a misaligned sender. Aggregate Reports Explained walks through every field.
The working procedure:
- Collect reports for a few weeks. Upload one to the DMARC report analyzer to see the format, or let SpoofKiller’s DMARC monitoring gather and group them by sender.
- For each legitimate source, note which identity is misaligned: SPF, DKIM, or both.
- Fix DKIM first. Turn on custom-domain signing at that sender. It survives forwarding and works in either alignment mode when the domains match.
- Add a custom Return-Path where the sender offers one, for a second aligned pass.
- Re-check the reports. Then, and only then, tighten the policy.
A sender that offers neither custom DKIM nor a custom Return-Path cannot be aligned with your main domain. Your choices are to replace it, or to give it a subdomain of its own with a separate policy. The sending sources documentation explains how SpoofKiller labels each one while you decide.

