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SpoofKiller
Free tool · runs in your browser

Every email carries its own travel record. Read it.

Paste the raw headers of any message to see who it claims to be from, whether SPF, DKIM, and DMARC agreed, each server it passed through, and where it waited. The analysis happens in your browser; the headers are never sent to us.

What the analyzer extracts

The part of the message your mail app prefers you not see.

Headers are written by every server that touches a message. They are tedious, and they are the only evidence there is.

The identities
The From address and its domain, the Return-Path where bounces go, and the Reply-To where your answer would go. Three fields that are supposed to be related and need not be.
Authentication verdicts
The SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results the receiving server recorded in Authentication-Results, with the domain each one authenticated.
Alignment
Whether the domain that passed SPF or DKIM matches the From domain, relaxed or exact. This is the test DMARC applies, and where most confusion lives. Alignment explained.
DKIM signatures
Each signature’s domain, selector, algorithm, and canonicalization, and whether the From header is covered. The selector can go straight into the DKIM checker.
The route and the delays
Every Received header in order, from the first server to the last, with the time spent between each hop. Useful when a message arrived an hour late and two departments blame each other.
Evidence, flagged
A Reply-To at a different domain, an email address hiding in the display name, a failed DMARC result. Each is stated as what it is and what else could explain it.
How to read the result

The From line is whatever the sender typed.

Email was designed by people who trusted one another. The From header, the one your mail app displays in bold, is supplied by the sender and checked by nobody unless the receiving server goes to some trouble. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC are that trouble. The receiving server performs the checks and writes its conclusions into a header called Authentication-Results, which is where this tool looks first.

Read that header with one rule in mind: trust only the copy added by your own mail provider, which is the topmost one. Anything lower was already on the message when it arrived, and a forger can write “dmarc=pass” as easily as anything else. This is also why the tool reports what the headers say and does not claim to have verified the message. Re-checking a DKIM signature takes the complete, unmodified message, not a paste of its headers.

Then weigh the findings as a detective would, not a judge. A Return-Path at another domain is how nearly every email service operates. A DMARC failure can be forwarding. But a display name containing one address, a From line containing another, and a Reply-To at a third is a pattern with few innocent explanations. The varieties are described in domain impersonation protection. If the message used your domain, see what it publishes with the domain health check and its DMARC policy; the mechanics are in how DMARC works. If mail is arriving late or in spam, the deliverability checklist starts where this tool ends.

A halftone paper envelope wearing a black carnival mask on a red background, standing in for forged email.
The envelope says who it is from. The postmarks say where it has been. They do not always agree.
Common problems and fixes

What the headers tend to show.

  • dkim=pass, spf=pass, dmarc=fail

    Both checks passed for the sending service's domain, not for the domain in the From address. Nothing aligned. The sender needs to enable custom-domain signing at that service.

  • spf=fail on forwarded mail

    The forwarder's server is not in the original sender's SPF record, and cannot be. This is expected. An aligned DKIM signature is what lets forwarded mail pass DMARC.

  • dkim=fail with “body hash did not verify”

    Something changed the message after it was signed: a mailing list footer, a security gateway rewriting links, a disclaimer added in transit. The sender's key is usually fine.

  • No DKIM-Signature at all

    The sending system is not signing. If it is yours, turn on DKIM at the provider. The message can then pass DMARC only through SPF, and not at all once forwarded.

  • A long gap at one hop

    The server named after the gap held the message: a queue, greylisting, or content scanning. Clocks differ by seconds, so ignore small gaps and negative ones.

  • The message forged your own domain and was delivered

    Check the dmarc= result and the policy shown beside it. If your domain is at p=none, receivers were asked to deliver it. The remedy is an enforced policy.

How to

How to analyze email headers

Read the authentication results and delivery path of a message from its raw headers.

  1. 1

    Open the raw message

    In your mail app, choose Show original, View message source, or View all headers for the message.

  2. 2

    Copy and paste the headers

    Copy everything above the first blank line and paste it into the analyzer. Including the body does no harm; it is ignored.

  3. 3

    Read the three verdicts

    Check the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results and whether each authenticated domain aligns with the From domain.

  4. 4

    Follow the path

    Review the hops in order and the delay at each to see where the message came from and where it waited.

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FAQ

Questions about this tool

Straight answers. If yours is not here, ask us and a person will reply.

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One header is an anecdote. Reports are the data.

Create a free account to collect DMARC aggregate reports for your domain: every source receivers saw sending as you, not just the one message somebody forwarded.