Skip to content
SpoofKiller
Free tool · free account to upload

Turn a DMARC XML report into something a person can read.

Upload the aggregate report a mailbox provider sent you, zipped or not. Get a table: which servers sent mail as your domain, how many messages, what passed, what failed, and what the receiver did about it. Free with an account and a confirmed email address. Nothing is stored.

What the analyzer shows

Everything in the file, minus the angle brackets.

An aggregate report is a ledger. One receiver, one day, every server that sent mail claiming to be you.

Who sent the report, and for when
The reporting organization, the period covered, and the report ID. Each report describes only the mail that one receiver saw.
The policy the receiver found
The DMARC record as the receiver read it on the day: p, sp, pct, and alignment modes. Useful for confirming that a change you made was actually seen.
Pass and fail totals
Messages that passed DMARC, and how many aligned through DKIM and through SPF. A message needs only one of the two.
Every sending source
Each source IP with its message count, alignment results, the domains that authenticated, and the disposition: delivered, quarantined, or rejected.
A likely sender for the top sources
For the highest-volume addresses, reverse DNS and network ownership are looked up and matched against known providers, with a confidence figure and the evidence. How sources are identified.
Safe handling of hostile files
Reports arrive from strangers. The parser detects the real format from the file's bytes, caps decompressed size, and refuses XML with DOCTYPE or entity declarations.
How to read the result

A failing row is a question, not an accusation.

The first DMARC report anyone opens produces the same reaction: there are servers in here I have never heard of. Usually that is not an attack. It is the discovery that your domain sends mail from more places than anyone wrote down. The booking system. The survey tool marketing tried once. A forwarding address at a university, relaying your newsletter to an alumnus and failing SPF on the way, as forwarding does.

So read each failing source with three possibilities in mind. It may be a legitimate service of yours that was never set up to sign with your domain, in which case the fix is at that service. It may be forwarding or a mailing list, in which case a small steady failure rate is normal and nothing needs fixing. Or it may be someone sending as you without permission, which is the reason to move toward an enforced policy. The guide to understanding DMARC reports walks through telling them apart, and aggregate reports explained covers every XML field.

Keep the limits in view. Reports come only from receivers that choose to send them, so they are a large sample of your mail and not a census. And one file is one receiver for one day. The patterns that matter, a source that appears every Tuesday, a pass rate drifting down, show up across weeks. That is the argument for DMARC monitoring, and for spoofing detection that weighs the evidence for you. For a single file, this page will do. To check what the domain publishes today, use the DMARC checker.

An analyst's desk seen from above, with printed charts, a magnifying glass, and a stack of envelopes.
One report is a day's ledger from one receiver. The story is in the stack.
Common problems and fixes

What the reports usually reveal.

  • A known service failing DMARC

    It is sending with its own domain in the signature and Return-Path. Turn on custom-domain DKIM (and a custom Return-Path where offered) in that service's settings, using the values it gives you.

  • SPF aligned, DKIM not, or the reverse

    DMARC needs only one, so the mail passes. Fix the other anyway: mail that relies on SPF alone fails the moment it is forwarded.

  • Small volumes failing from many unrelated networks

    This is the typical signature of forwarding. If DKIM is aligned on your direct mail, forwarded copies will mostly survive. No DNS change is needed.

  • A source you cannot identify

    Look at its reverse DNS and the domains it authenticated as. If it belongs to no service you use and fails both checks, it is a candidate for unauthorized sending, and a reason to tighten your policy.

  • Legitimate mail quarantined or rejected

    Your policy is ahead of your configuration. Step back to the previous policy, fix the failing source, and move up again. See how to reach p=reject.

  • The file will not upload

    This tool accepts XML, ZIP, and GZ files up to 4 MB, which covers ordinary daily reports. Very large reports from high-volume domains exceed that limit; a SpoofKiller account receives reports by email instead of by upload.

How to

How to read a DMARC aggregate report

Convert a DMARC XML report into a readable summary of sending sources.

  1. 1

    Find a report

    Open the mailbox named in your DMARC record's rua tag and save an attachment. Reports arrive as .xml, .zip, or .gz files.

  2. 2

    Upload the file

    Drop the file on the analyzer or choose it from your device. Compressed files do not need to be unpacked.

  3. 3

    Check the totals

    Read the pass rate and how many messages aligned through DKIM and SPF.

  4. 4

    Review failing sources

    For each source with failures, decide whether it is your service, a forwarder, or unknown, and act accordingly.

See all twelve free tools

FAQ

Questions about this tool

Straight answers. If yours is not here, ask us and a person will reply.

Ask a question

Free, no obligation

Looking at a report and not sure what it means?

Tell us the domain. We will explain what the sources in a typical report for it are likely to be, and which ones deserve attention.

  • A person reads every message
  • No sales sequence, no list rental
  • Reply within one business day

We use your details to reply. Nothing else.

You just read one report by hand. More arrive tomorrow.

Create a free account, add the reporting address to your DMARC record, and let the reports be read for you.