Enforcement Readiness: Green, Yellow, Red
What the readiness status measures and how to move safely toward p=reject.
Updated
A DMARC policy of p=none watches. p=quarantine and p=reject act: they tell receivers to divert or refuse mail that fails (the three policies compared). The trouble is that the policy cannot tell your forgotten invoicing system from a forger. Both fail; both get refused. Enforcement readiness answers one question for each domain: given what the reports show, is the next step toward enforcement likely to cost you legitimate mail?
The answer is a color with reasons attached. It is computed from the latest DNS scan, your sender classifications, and the last 45 days of aggregate reports. Every threshold is listed on this page.
The statuses
| Color | Label | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Green | Enforcement Candidate | Observed legitimate senders appear properly configured and nothing is outstanding. One specific next step is suggested. |
| Yellow | Review Required | Nothing is actively broken, but one or more items need attention or more time before the policy should change. |
| Red | Authentication Problems | Legitimate mail is failing, or there is no DMARC policy at all. Tightening the policy now would get real mail quarantined or rejected. |
| Green | Fully Enforced | The domain is at p=reject with pct=100, legitimate mail is passing, and nothing is outstanding. There is nothing further to strengthen. |
Red is checked first, then yellow; green is what remains. A domain already at p=reject, pct=100 that has items to review shows yellow with the headline “Enforced, with items to review.”
What makes a domain red
Any one of these is enough.
| Criterion | Threshold |
|---|---|
| No DMARC policy is published | The first step is a p=none record with a reporting address; without one there is no data to decide anything. |
| A legitimate sender is failing DMARC | A source with at least 20 messages, of which more than 10% fail. “Legitimate” means you marked it Approved, or it was identified as a known provider with at least 70% confidence. Sources marked Unauthorized or Ignored are excluded. |
| The overall pass rate is low | Below 90% of observed mail passing DMARC, once at least 100 messages have been observed. |
The second row is the heart of the feature. A failing legitimate sender is the one situation in which enforcement does active harm, so it overrides everything else. The fix is almost always to give that service a DKIM signing domain or a return-path under your own domain, so that it aligns; DMARC Alignment Explained describes what alignment requires, and the red status names each failing sender with its failure rate.
What holds a domain at yellow
If nothing is red, each of the following is checked. Any that applies is listed as an item to review, and one is enough for yellow.
| Criterion | Threshold | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Observation window | At least 14 days of reports before moving from p=none to quarantine; at least 30 days at any later step. Measured from the earliest to the latest report day in the window. | Infrequent senders only show up over time. |
| Message volume | At least 100 messages observed | Percentages of a handful of messages mean little. |
| Pass rate | 98% or better. Between 90% and 98% is yellow; below 90% is red. | The failing remainder is what enforcement will act on. |
| Unknown failing sources | Sources that are Unknown or Under Investigation, not identified as a known provider, and failing DMARC, together accounting for more than 2% of observed mail | Each is either a legitimate sender you have not recognized or an impersonator. You need to know which before acting. |
| Sources under investigation | Any source marked Under Investigation | An open inquiry should close before the policy changes. |
| Unresolved incidents | Any open or acknowledged finding of type potential unauthorized sender or approved sender failing authentication | These are precisely the findings that bear on enforcement. See Alerts and Notifications for how to resolve them. |
| Recent DNS changes | Any change to the SPF, DKIM, or DMARC records detected in the last 7 days | Reports lag by a day or more; the effect of a change has not been observed yet. |
| Report freshness | No reports received for more than 4 days | The picture may be stale. |
| Reporter coverage | Reports from at least 2 reporting organizations | One mailbox provider’s view is narrow. |
| SPF health | The SPF record has no errors that make it fail | A broken SPF record leaves DKIM as the only path to passing. The SPF checker shows the errors. |
| Reporting address | The DMARC record has a rua address | Without reports, the result of any change is invisible. |
| Report data | At least one aggregate report received | There is nothing to assess. |
The status also lists what counts in your favor: the days of data observed, the pass rate once it reaches 98%, the number of reporting organizations, and the absence of significant volume from unclassified failing sources. Most yellow items are cleared by classifying senders in Sending Sources, resolving findings, or simply waiting.
The roadmap: one step at a time
The roadmap has three stations, p=none, p=quarantine, and p=reject, each shown as done, current, next, or later. When the status is green, SpoofKiller suggests exactly one move, never a leap. The pct tag does the ramping: it asks receivers to apply the policy to only that percentage of failing mail and treat the rest under the next weaker policy.
| Current record | Suggested change | Then |
|---|---|---|
p=none | p=quarantine; pct=25 | Raise pct to 50 and then 100 over the following weeks, as reports stay clean |
p=quarantine, pct below 50 | p=quarantine; pct=50 | On to 100 |
p=quarantine, pct 50 to 99 | p=quarantine; pct=100 | On to reject |
p=quarantine, pct 100 | p=reject | Fully Enforced, if nothing else is outstanding |
p=reject, pct below 100 | p=reject; pct=100 | Fully Enforced |
After each change the criteria apply again from the top. In particular, editing the DMARC record is itself a recent DNS change, so the status returns to yellow for seven days while the effect is observed. This is the product declining to hurry you. The staged plan is discussed at length in How to Reach p=reject Without Losing Legitimate Mail.
SpoofKiller never modifies your DNS
You publish every change
Enforcement itself is not done by SpoofKiller either. A DMARC policy is a request to receiving mail servers, and they carry it out. Most large mailbox providers honor it; the standard does not oblige anyone to. When you are ready to publish a step, the DMARC record generator builds the record and the DMARC checker confirms what receivers will see.
Limits
- Readiness is drawn from reports sent by participating receivers. Mail delivered to receivers that send no reports is not visible, so a legitimate sender that only mails such receivers cannot be seen failing.
- A sender that mails less often than the observation window, such as an annual notice, may not appear in it. Keep your own list of systems that send as your domain and check it against Sending Sources.
- Indirect mail, meaning forwarding and mailing lists, will fail DMARC under any policy. Enforcement costs some of it. The reports show how much; whether that cost is acceptable is your decision.
- Readiness and the Protection Score measure different things. A domain can score well and be yellow, or be green at a modest score.
