A forger has four ways to borrow your company’s good name, and he is not sentimental about which one he uses. He will take the cheapest that works. Put a lock on the first and he tries the second. This is not a reason for despair. It is a reason to know all four, because the security industry has a habit of selling a lock for one door and describing it as a house.
What follows is a plain account of each method, the defense that actually applies, and the places where no product, including ours, can help you. The honest map is more useful than the reassuring one.
The four impersonations at a glance
| Method | What the victim sees | Does DMARC stop it? | What does |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exact-domain spoofing | pay@yourcompany.com | Yes, at an enforced policy | SPF, DKIM, DMARC at reject |
| Lookalike domain | pay@yourcornpany.com | No | Monitoring, takedown, defensive registration |
| Display-name spoofing | “Your Company” <x9@freemail.example> | No | Inbound filtering, training, process |
| Compromised account | The real pay@yourcompany.com | No; it passes | MFA, login monitoring, payment controls |
One row out of four. It happens to be the most dangerous row, which is why it comes first.
1. Exact-domain spoofing: the one you can close
Email was designed in a more trusting era, and the From line is whatever the sender types. Without further controls, anyone on earth can send a message as ceo@yourcompany.com. No account is broken into. Nothing is hacked. It is closer to writing a false return address on an envelope.
This is the forgery that DMARC was built for. With SPF and DKIM configured and a DMARC policy of p=reject, a receiving server that honors DMARC will refuse mail that uses your exact domain and cannot prove it came from you.
_dmarc.yourcompany.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourcompany.com"Two conditions apply, and both matter:
- The policy must be enforced. At
p=noneyou receive reports about forgeries, and the forgeries are delivered anyway. Check where you stand with the DMARC checker. - The receiver does the enforcing. Your record is a published instruction. Major mailbox providers follow it. A badly configured mail server somewhere may not.
Do not forget the domains you own and never use. A parked domain with no DMARC record is as forgeable as your main one was. The route to enforcement is in How to Reach p=reject, and the wider program in How to Prevent Email Spoofing.
Reports show who is trying. SpoofKiller’s spoofing detection separates sources that look like impersonation from those that look like forwarding or a misconfigured vendor, and shows its evidence. That distinction matters: a DMARC failure alone is not proof of spoofing.
2. Lookalike domains: the one DMARC cannot see
Lock your domain and the forger registers a different one. It costs about what lunch costs. The variations are well established:
| Technique | Example for yourcompany.com |
|---|---|
| Character swap | yourcornpany.com (r and n for m), y0urcompany.com |
| Missing or doubled letter | yourcompny.com, yourcommpany.com |
| Transposition | yourcomapny.com |
| Added word or hyphen | yourcompany-billing.com, your-company.com |
| Different ending | yourcompany.co, yourcompany.net |
| Homoglyph | A letter from another alphabet that looks identical on screen |
Here is the uncomfortable part. DMARC does nothing about these. Your policy governs your domain. The lookalike is a different domain, and its owner can publish flawless SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records of his own. His forged invoice then arrives fully authenticated, as him. Authentication proves which domain sent a message. It expresses no opinion on whether that domain is honest.
The defenses that do apply:
- Watch for registrations. You cannot respond to a lookalike you have not heard of. SpoofKiller’s domain security monitoring generates likely variants of your domain and checks daily for ones that have been registered, noting whether they have mail servers configured. A lookalike with MX records is a domain preparing to correspond.
- Request takedown. Report the domain to its registrar and hosting provider with evidence of abuse. If you hold a trademark, formal domain-dispute procedures exist. Results vary and are never instant.
- Register the obvious ones yourself. Buy the main alternate endings and the most likely misspellings, then lock them so they cannot send mail. You cannot buy them all, and should not try.
- Block inbound. Add known lookalikes to your own mail filter’s blocklist so your staff, at least, cannot be fooled by them.
- Warn the people at risk. When a lookalike turns up, tell your finance team and your largest customers what to look for.
The limit should be stated without decoration. SpoofKiller detects lookalike domains after they are registered. It cannot prevent anyone from registering one, and it cannot remove one. Detection is scheduled, not instantaneous. What you gain is time: the difference between learning of the domain this week and learning of it from a customer who has already paid the wrong account.
DMARC protects the name you own. It has nothing to say about the name next door that happens to look like yours in a small font.
3. Display-name spoofing: no domain required
The cheapest method needs no domain at all. The forger opens a free mailbox and sets the display name to your chief executive’s:
From: "Dana Whitfield, CEO" <dw.office7731@freemail.example>On a phone, most mail apps show only the name. The address is hidden behind a tap that nobody makes. The message passes SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, all for the free mail provider’s domain, which really did send it. Your DMARC policy is never consulted, because your domain appears nowhere in the message.
DMARC does not help here. The defenses are on the receiving side, and they are partly human:
- Inbound filtering. Most business mail systems can flag or quarantine messages whose display name matches an executive while the address is external. Turn that on.
- External-sender labels. A banner on mail from outside the organization makes “the CEO” writing from a free account look as odd as it is.
- Training. Teach people to look at the address and to distrust urgency. It helps. It is not sufficient.
- Process. The control that works: no payment, bank-detail change, or gift-card purchase on the strength of an email alone. Confirm by a phone number already on file. A rule does not get tired or flattered.
You can protect your own staff this way. You cannot do it for your customers, who receive such mail in systems you do not control. For them, the best you can do is state publicly how you will and will not ask for money.
4. Compromised accounts: when the forger is logged in
The fourth method is not forgery in the technical sense. The attacker obtains a real password, by phishing or reuse, and signs in to a real mailbox. He reads the correspondence, waits for an invoice to come due, and replies in the thread with new bank details.
Every check passes, and correctly. The mail was sent from your servers, by your account, with your signature. DMARC passes, because the message is authentic. It is the sender who is not. Monitoring your DMARC reports will not reveal it either; the mail looks like all your other mail.
The same applies when a vendor you authorized is compromised. If their system is allowed to send as your domain, so is whoever controls it. Defenses belong to account security, not email authentication:
- Multi-factor authentication on every mailbox, without exceptions for senior people.
- Alerts for unfamiliar sign-ins and for new forwarding or inbox rules, a favorite tool for hiding replies.
- Retiring sender authorizations you no longer need, and limiting vendors to subdomains.
- The same payment-verification rule as above. It defeats this attack as well.
A layered plan, in order of return
No single control covers all four. Assembled in this order, the layers cover most of the ground:
- Close exact-domain spoofing. Get every domain you own to
p=reject. This is the only layer that protects your customers and partners as well as your staff. Begin with a domain health check. - Watch for lookalikes and act on the ones with mail configured.
- Harden inbound mail against display-name tricks.
- Secure accounts with multi-factor authentication.
- Fix the payment process, which catches whatever slips past the first four.
When a suspicious message does arrive, paste its headers into the email header analyzer. It shows which domain actually sent the message and which checks it passed, and that tells you which of the four methods you are looking at. For the mechanics behind those verdicts, see DMARC Alignment Explained and What Is DMARC?
Where SpoofKiller fits, and where it stops
SpoofKiller handles the first two layers. It reads your DMARC reports, identifies who is sending as your domain, and guides you to enforcement. It checks daily for registered lookalikes of your domain and watches your DNS for changes. Lookalike and DNS monitoring are part of the Pro plan; see pricing for what each plan includes.
It does not filter your inbound mail, secure your passwords, or approve your wire transfers. Nobody’s DMARC product does, whatever the brochure implies. A domain with a perfect Protection Score has closed the door that was standing widest open. The other three still need their own locks.

